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Abstract Cities in the United States engage in action on cli-
mate change, even as the federal government remains resis-
tant to comprehensive climate policy. While experts gener-
ally agree that local level adaptation and mitigation policies
are critical to avoiding the worst climate impacts, the de-
gree to which cities communicate climate change issues to
their constituents has yet to be fully explored. In this article,
we evaluate how U.S. cities communicate climate change
related issues, problems, and policies. We use a computer-
assisted approach to evaluate climate change efforts by cities
by examining the full text of press releases of 82 large cities
in the United States. We first identify who discusses cli-
mate change, finding that many large cities in the United
States address climate change in their public communica-
tion. Second, we examine the content of these discussions.
Many cities discuss weather-related concerns in conjunction
with broad collaborative efforts to address global warming,
while city-based policy discussions focus more on energy
and transportation efforts. Third, we evaluate the local fac-
tors associated with these discussions. We find that the city’s
climate vulnerability is particularly influential in shaping the
level and timing of climatic communication.
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1 Introduction
When Donald Trump announced that the United States would
be withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accords, the response
from local governments was to reaffirm their policy commit-
ment to addressing climate change (Mayors National Cli-
mate Action Agenda 2017).1 For example, when President
Trump tweeted “I was elected to represent Pittsburgh, not
Paris,” Bill Peduto, Mayor of Pittsburgh, responded by tweet-
ing the city “will follow the guidelines of the Paris Agree-
ment.” In this paper, we show that these responses are a con-
tinuation of attention given to climate change by U.S. cities.
The literature on climate change policy often focuses on
how local governments are engaging in robust action to ad-
dress the negative effects of global warming. In the United
States, research focuses on cities because they offer a path
towards meaningful action on climate change, while the fed-
eral government remains inactive. Much of this research fo-
cuses on state level action (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2016),
case studies of key cities (McCormick 2016), or examines
specific actions like joining the International Council on Lo-
cal Environmental Initiatives (Krause 2011) or engaging in
particular mitigation efforts (Reckien et al. 2014). We build
on this scholarship with a rich new database of press releases
from cities about climate change mitigation and adaptation
efforts. In doing so, we measure the extent to which cities
talk about climate change and how the issues are communi-
cated over time.
We argue that evaluating city communication on climate
change is central to understanding what governments are
doing about climate change and why governments are ad-
1 The Mayors National Climate Action Agenda may be accessed at
http://www.climate-mayors.org/blog/
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dressing climate change in a public manner. Specifically, we
address three central questions:
1. Which cities discuss climate change in their public com-
munication?
2. When cities discuss climate change, which problems and
solutions do they discuss?
3. Are these discussions related to climate vulnerability,
extreme weather, economics or political factors?
In doing so, we use a new, large dataset of press releases
from cities and employ a computational approach to identify
climate change related discussions from city governments.
This process allows us to examine not just which cities are
engaged in climate change discussions, but also the content,
focus, and timing of these discussions. We build on an in-
novative body of scholarship that uses text documents to
evaluate the stances of political actors and institutions (e.g.,
Grimmer and Stewart 2013a, King et al. 2013, Greene and
O’Brien 2016).
Which factors are associated with higher levels of cli-
mate related discussions? By estimating the probability that
any city in our dataset will discuss climate change in any
given month, we find that these climate-focused discussions
are related to climate vulnerability, even when controlling
for economic and political factors And, while the city’s po-
litical liberalness does shape the probability of climate dis-
cussions, vulnerability continues to matter, suggesting that
cities may be able to overcome some of the partisan grid-
lock associated with climate change in the United States.
Overall, our results suggest that cities are reacting to the
challenges they face from climate change and engaging in
entrepreneurial efforts to shape US climate policy.
2 Background
2.1 Urban climate vulnerability and an opportunity for
action
The U.S. urban population has increased steadily over the
last several centuries, with a significant majority of Amer-
icans living in cities and more than 80% living in Census
classified urban areas. The residents of these urban areas
are increasingly at risk from climatic changes: Kjellstrom
and McMichael (2013) demonstrate that many cities in the
United States are particularly vulnerable to climate change
through a variety of direct, indirect, and systemic causes.
This vulnerability relates to events like extreme weather,
sea-level rise, and changing climate, but also is associated
with climate change as a multiplier effect, which increases
health risks (i.e., Bambrick et al. (2011)).2
While cities are particularly vulnerable to climate change
related effects, they also offer an opportunity for action that
is unavailable or unlikely at the federal or state level in the
United States. Indeed, the U.S. federal government is cur-
rently unwilling to address climate change (Foran 2016). In
addition, geographic differences in ideology in the United
States, with liberal urban areas and conservative rural ar-
eas (Bui and Pearce 2016), mean that cities offer a polit-
ical environment where climate change action is not only
accepted, but may be expected. For example, while the state
of Louisiana’s conservative population and heavy reliance
on oil and gas revenues means an unwillingness to engage
in climate change action, the liberal city of New Orleans is
willing to engage in direct action.3 Political leaders in these
urban areas may also be more likely to use climate change
as an issue in competitive elections (Egan 2013). Cities also
have control over land-use, building standard, and zoning
policies, which can shape both causes of and reactions to cli-
mate change. Finally, cities are largely unencumbered by in-
ternational treaty negotiations that hamper international ac-
tion (Rosenzweig et al. 2010).
Local efforts have the potential to be impactful, both in
terms of how much cities contribute to climate change and
their mitigation and adaptation activities. Cities and their
residents are responsible for up to 70% of global greenhouse
gas emissions (Habitat 2011). New York alone produced 49
million tons of carbon dioxide in 2014, which is one-fifth
of the entire carbon production of France. Yet, this produc-
tion of greenhouse gasses is not irreversible: cities have a
wide range of policy options to shape overall emissions lev-
els. For example, Lutsey and Sperling (2008) estimated that
the realization of all sub-national initiatives could stabilize
US emissions at 2010 levels by the year 2020. Further, cities
have been successful in shrinking their carbon footprints:
New York’s 2014 rate of carbon production is a 13% reduc-
tion from 2005 rates.
2.2 Press releases and political communications from cities
Press releases are an important tool for measuring precisely
what cities and their leaders wish to communicate with con-
2 Our usage of the term “vulnerability” in this study corresponds
mostly to the expected exposure of a given locale to future climate-
related hazards. That is, we focus on the external and biophysical di-
mensions of vulnerability (Fu¨ssel 2007).
3 See https://www.nola.gov/mayor/press-releases/
2016/20160425-pr-planning-tool-for-adapting-to-
climate/
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stituents. They are used regularly to highlight positive as-
pects of governance and represent strategic decisions (Grim-
mer 2013a;b, Grimmer et al. 2012). Indeed, extant scholar-
ship has called press releases “a nearly ideal source” (Grim-
mer 2013b, p. 8) of data for measuring how political actors
communicate their priorities to constituents or “The Holy
Grail” for “getting into the news” (Palser 2006, p. 90). They
are also used to establish issue ownership in political cam-
paigns (Vavreck 2009). What cities communicate via press
releases thus offers an opportunity to examine credit claim-
ing, constituent outreach, and efforts to spread information
to news sources by local governments.
Press releases have been used successfully in the past to
evaluate the policy priorities of U.S. Congressional repre-
sentatives (Grimmer 2010). Press releases, moreover, have
a multiplying effect—local news sources often pull sections
of text directly from press releases when generating content,
serving as “information subsidies” (Golitsynskiy 2013). Re-
leases can also be used in agenda setting, candidate image
management, and to influence both the amount and tone of
coverage (Comrie 1997, Kiousis et al. 2006, Waters et al.
2010). We thus argue that evaluating climate change com-
munication from cities’ press releases represents an impor-
tant — even ideal — measure of local government engage-
ment on this issue.
3 Measuring city climate communication
3.1 Data
In order to examine city level climate communication, we
utilize press releases from a sample of major American cities.4
We began with the fifty largest cities in the United States, as
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates.
Next, given our interest in the relationship between climate
vulnerability and the policy agenda, we then added any city
that appeared on three lists of climate vulnerable cities5 and
a matched set of thirty cities (based on population and %
white) that did not appear on the lists. Some overlap oc-
curred between the list of vulnerable cities, control set, and
4 Replication materials are available at https://github.com/
traviscoan/city_climate_communication.git
5 The lists include 1) Climate Disruption Index (Weather.com),
Cities That Could Disappear List (Huffington Post), or the Halle-
gatte Rankings (Hallegatte et al. 2013), which are based on pro-
jected sea level rise and storm surge risk. We also note how
the Climate Disruption Index evaluates US cities (population >
200,000) according to vulnerability to sea level rise, extreme precip-
itation, drought, and heat, and average temperature and precipitation
change. See https://goo.gl/j4c61m for methodology discussions and
https://goo.gl/X771Rn for a response from climate scientists.
fifty largest cities, reducing the number of total cities to 82.
We focus on large cities because major cities contribute a
substantial share of overall US greenhouse gas emissions.
Our sample account for roughly 17% of all US city green-
house gas emissions.6 Smaller cities also tend to suffer from
issues of data availability for both climate vulnerability and
control variables.7 After identifying the set of U.S. cities to
be studied, we developed software to harvest all available
releases from each city’s website, producing 76,249 docu-
ments.
3.2 Classifying climate change-related communication
Given the size of the overall press release corpus, manually
identifying climate change related communication is unfea-
sible and thus we turn to computer assisted methods. Specif-
ically, we rely on a supervised learning approach to classify
city level climate communication, similar to that used by
Genovese (2014).
The first step when using a supervised approach is to
decide on suitable, manually annotated training and testing
sets. There are a number of practical challenges to achieving
this objective when using the press release corpus, yet the
most significant challenge is the presence of considerable
“class imbalance” between climate and non-climate related
releases. Many issues demand communication from cities;
discussions of climate change are likely to be relatively in-
frequent. As such, identifying a training set via a simple ran-
dom sample is hopelessly inefficient.
We devised a simple sampling procedure that consid-
ers the likelihood of classifying false negatives (i.e., miss-
ing climate change press releases) and false positives (i.e.,
incorrectly classifying a non-relevant release as related to
climate change) to overcome this challenge. First, consider
the issue of false negatives: our goal is to minimize poten-
tial false negatives and thus identify the majority of press
releases that could relate climate change. To do so, we con-
structed a climate-related keyword dictionary with the in-
tention of including any relevant keyword. The keywords
include terms directly related to climate change (including
climate change, global warming, greenhouse, emissions, sea
level rise, carbon dioxide, co2, climatic, climate resili*, cli-
mate vulner*, climate sci*, and oc2), weather (including
flood, hurricane, tornado, storm, drought, heat wave, and
wildfire), energy (including renewable, solar, wind power,
6 Specifically, our sample of 82 cities accounts for 982 million
tCO2e/yr out of a total US city footprint of 6,232 million tCO2e/yr.
See Jones and Kammen (2014) for more details.
7 See Holman (2015) for a discussion of issues of data availability
and reliability in smaller cities.
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hydroelectric, green energy, biogas, and energy efficiency),
and transportation (including hybrid vehic*, electric vehic*,
fuel standard, and fuel cell). To ensure a comprehensive ini-
tial list of keywords, we cross-referenced our dictionary against
a corpus of climate change material specific to U.S. cities. In
the end, this process produced a set of 35 keywords, which
were then used to identify 9,601 releases (12.59% of the cor-
pus) potentially related to climate change. We provide de-
tailed examples and a qualitative discussion of the climate
change, weather, energy, and transportation categories in
Appendix I.
By casting a wide net, false positives are likely, as the
keywords used to identify relevant press releases have mul-
tiple meanings. 8. To address this issue, we trained a sup-
port vector machine (SVM) to classify climate-related dis-
cussion in the reduced set of 9,601 press releases. First, we
randomly selected a set of documents (n = 697) and an au-
thor manually coded whether they contained clear climate
change content (see the appendix); 142 were climate change
related, indicating a high level of false-positives. We then
preprocessed the release text9 and trained a linear SVM to
identify the true climate change press releases. We then as-
sessed the model’s out-of-sample classification performance
via 10-fold cross validation (e.g., Picard and Cook 1984).
This method randomly segments the releases into 10 sub-
samples, where we use 90% for training and 10% to test out-
of-sample performance. Cross-validation results indicate that
the classifier is relatively accurate in distinguishing climate
change related press releases from within the sample created
from keywords, with an average F1 score of 0.81 (mean pre-
cision = 0.85 and mean recall = 0.77). Finally, we used the
fitted model to project out to the 9,601 releases that had at
least one of our climate change keywords, which reduces the
sample to 2,849 climate-related releases.
4 Who discusses climate change?
Which cities are more likely to discuss climate change in
their press releases? We approach this question by using
a sample of releases (January 2014 - February 2017 (n =
43,486). We reduced the sample analyses because of the sig-
nificant heterogeneity in temporal coverage of cities in our
general sample, as typically only the releases of the current
administration are made available online. Only three cities
in our sample cover the entire 2000-2016 period (Lincoln,
8 Consider the following reference to “energy” by New York City
mayor Bill de Blasio (November 22, 2015), “Because we embraced
wave after wave of immigrants who brought their energy...”
9 Prior to training the model, we removed common “stop words,”
stemmed, and converted the raw tokens to term frequency-inverse doc-
ument frequency (TF-IDF) features.
NE; Boston, MA; Honolulu, HI), while 48.7% of the cities
enter the dataset in 2014.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the cities in our sam-
ple, standardized by the number of releases. We can iden-
tify clear leaders in climate communication, such as Port-
land (OR) and San Diego (CA). Descriptively, those climate
vulnerable cities (orange diamonds) tend to have a higher
proportion of climate-relevant communication. Boston, New
York, Chicago, and Pittsburgh are the cities with the highest
absolute number of climate-relevant releases; see Appendix
B for a list of the absolute counts by city.
In addition to variation by city in climate communica-
tion, we also observe temporal variation of climate discus-
sion over the 2000-2017 period for cities with available press
releases over time. The discussion by the Boston mayor’s
office tracks well with national and international newspa-
per coverage of climate change (e.g., Boykoff et al. 2015,
Boussalis et al. 2016). Lincoln’s discussions peak in 2011.
Honolulu engages in a low-level of discussion over the en-
tire time period, with a small decrease starting in 2015.
What about temporal variation across all the cities and
press releases? As is clear in Figure 2, which provides ag-
gregated press releases over time, vulnerability to climatic
changes shapes levels of climate change discussions, with
highly vulnerable cities discussing more climate-related themes
than less vulnerable cities over time.
5 How are cities discussing climate change?
We next examine the content of these climate change discus-
sions. In general, cities provide detailed and comprehensive
information on efforts to mitigate or adapt to climate change.
Press releases with energy keywords are the most common
in our dataset (78.2%), following by climate change (40.1%).
Within these topics, press releases also discussed weather
(19.6%) and transportation (4.6%). Climate change and weather
related press releases focus on adaptation, on broad approaches
to address climate change, resiliency plans, and organiza-
tional or bureaucratic work to transform the city’s approach
to global warming. Alternatively, energy and transportation
related press releases focus on specific policies or programs
to change behavior or mitigate the effects of climate change.
Please refer to the appendix for a detailed qualitative sum-
mary of the press release content.
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Fig. 1: Panel (a) displays the proportion of climate-related releases for 82 cities over the period 1/2014-2/2017. Cities with high climate change
vulnerability = orange diamond, less vulnerable = a blue square. Panels (b) - (d) display the monthly proportion of classified releases over the
1/2000-2/2017 period for the cities of Boston (MA), Lincoln (NE), and Honolulu (HI), respectively, overlaid with local polynomial line to assist
with interpretation.
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Fig. 2: This plot displays the monthly share of classified press releases over the 1/2014-2/2017 period, by level of climate vulnerability. The
orange (solid, diamond) series illustrates the climate-relevant communication of highly vulnerable cities, whereas the blue (dashed, square) series
represents that of cities with lower vulnerability.
6 Does climate vulnerability predict city climate
communication?
What climatic, political, economic and demographic factors
explain variation of discussion of climate change by cities?
To answer this question, we focus on the press releases of
all our cities from January 2014 — February 2017.
6.1 Outcome and independent variables
Given that climate discussions may vary over time, we an-
alyze two dependent variables of month-year discussions
derived from the press releases identified in Section 3.2.
First, we code all climate-related discussion—including di-
rect mentions of climate change and energy, weather, and
transportation topics related to climate change—as 1 for cities
that published such a release in a given month-year and zero
otherwise. Our second dependent variable, explicit discus-
sion of climate change, is similarly coded as 1 for a city gov-
ernment that has released a statement that explicitly men-
tions “climate change” or “global warming” in a particular
month-year. Distinguishing between these is important be-
cause more conservative cities may utilize alternative fram-
ing strategies from those of liberal areas when talking about
climate change.
We focus on a range of city level covariates that may
help explain variation in whether a mayor’s office discusses
climate change. To ease interpretation, we have standardized
all our independent variables to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one, except if they are already a di-
chotomous variable. Full results are available in Appendix
G. Summary information for all the variables is also avail-
able in Appendix F.
The main explanatory variable in our study is the climate
vulnerability of a given city. This variable takes the value of
1 (“high vulnerability”) if the city has been listed on any of
the climate vulnerable lists that we discuss in Section 3.1.
Cities not found on any of these lists are coded as 0 (“low
vulnerability”). We expect that cities with a high level of
vulnerability will be more likely to communicate the issue
in their press releases.
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Climate change has become a hyper-politicized issue in
the United States (Dunlap et al. 2016). Public opinion data
show a growing divide across partisans on the issue of cli-
mate change (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2014). A 2017 Gallup
poll of Americans shows that while 90% of Democrats re-
ported elevated levels of concern about climate change, only
36% of Republicans held the same view (Norman 2017).
A wide gap in perceptions about climate change also exists
among policymakers. An analysis of the 115th U.S. Congress
reveals how 59% of House Republicans and 73% of Repub-
lican Senators publicly deny the existence of climate change,
that humans are causing it, and/or that climate scientists over-
whelmingly agree on the these points (Koronowski 2017).
Beyond climate change, more general attitudes about envi-
ronmental protection have also been connected to partisan-
ship, with Democratic areas being more likely to support en-
vironmental protection (Coan and Holman 2008). Mayors of
cities in more liberal locales should be more likely to discuss
climate change in their press releases. We proxy citizen po-
litical ideology with the county-level vote share for Barack
Obama in the 2008 presidential election. We also include a
measure of mayor partisanship in models with similar ex-
pectations.
We next examine the effect of climatic conditions on cli-
mate change communication by controlling for local tem-
perature anomaly, measured as the monthly difference in
city temperature to the 1901-1991 period average, based on
data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration.10 Li et al. (2011) posit that short-term weather
effects may lead people to use local weather patterns as cues
for understanding the more complex concept of global cli-
mate change. For example, there is a positive relationship
between warm temperature anomalies and belief in climate
change (e.g., Scruggs and Benegal 2012, Bohr 2017), though
the evidence is mixed (see Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014). In
climate change discussions by governmental actors, the em-
pirical findings on the effects of weather are mixed (Liu et al.
2009, Herrnstadt and Muehlegger 2014). We hypothesize
that temperature anomalies will push the issue of climate
change up on the city’s agenda and, holding other factors
constant, will increase the likelihood that it is mentioned in
press releases.
The economy of a city could also influence climate change
discussions. Economic recessions may induce people to pri-
oritize economic well-being over environmental security (e.g.
Inglehart 1995, Guber 2003, Scruggs and Benegal 2012, Shum
2012, Coan and Holman 2008). Unemployment, for exam-
ple, is negatively related with public concern for climate
change (Kahn and Kotchen 2011, Brulle et al. 2012, Scruggs
and Benegal 2012). We posit that this effect should trans-
10 See Appendix E for a list of starting base periods.
late to the political agenda of a city. Therefore, cities will be
less likely, holding other factors constant, to discuss climate
change as unemployment increases. An alternative view is
that cities often struggle financially, given the constraints of
local government financing (Holman 2015). In our time pe-
riod, the Obama administration made resources available to
cities for climate change efforts. As such, it may be strug-
gling cities who engage in climate activism because of the
potential for external resources from the federal government.
We use data from the 2014 Census to measure unemploy-
ment as the county-level percentage of the population (16
years+ and in the civilian labor force) who are unemployed.
Public opinion research has also investigated the effects
of income on attitudes about climate change. Scruggs and
Benegal (2012) find a negative effect of income on individual-
level agreement with the the scientific basis for global warm-
ing. In their model of American attitudes on the environ-
ment, however, Franzen and Vogl (2013) find a positive ef-
fect of income on concern for environmental issues, con-
sistent with other research (e.g., Gelissen 2007, Coan and
Holman 2008). In line with most research, we expect that
a city’s agenda will be more responsive to concerns about
climate change in locales with higher incomes. We measure
income as the county-level median household income, with
data gathered from the 2014 U.S. Census.
The form of local government may also influence whether
and how a city government discusses climate change. We
consider the effect of either a mayor-council form of gov-
ernment, where the mayor has more independent power and
authority, or a council-manager form of government, where
the city manager (an appointed position) has more power. In
the former, the mayor’s preferences are more likely to trans-
late into policy (Sharp et al. 2011). In the latter, leaders are
insulated from political pressures and are less agile in pol-
icy formation (Lubell et al. 2009). We therefore expect that
cities with the mayor-council form of government will be
more likely to engage in climate change discussions.
Lastly, we control for the log of total population and the
log of press releases in a given month-year, which serves to
normalize the data. We expect that cities with larger popu-
lations (from the 2014 US Census) and more press releases
will be more likely to mention the issue of climate change,
holding other factors constant. Press release counts proxy
local government professionalization.
6.2 Statistical methods
With the relevant variables in hand, the next step is to spec-
ify a model suitable for examining variation in climate dis-
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cussion across cities and over time. The city press release
data is inherently multilevel: cities are nested within state
policy environments and are also grouped into months. To
account for this structure, we employ a Bayesian random ef-
fects model that allows for cities to be hierarchically nested
within states and cross classified with a month-year. We em-
ploy a logistic regression approach due to the binary nature
of our outcome variables and incorporate random intercepts
for state, city, and the month-year, thus partially pooling
our estimates across relevant grouping variables. Further, to
minimize the potential for over-fitting, we use regularizing
priors in all models. See Appendix C for more information
on our methods.
6.3 Results
Figure 3 (and a related table in Appendix G) provide es-
timates from the hierarchical logistic regression models for
discussions of climate change in any particular month. Specif-
ically, the plot displays the coefficients (log odds) based on
mean posterior value, with the 50% and 95% credible inter-
vals of the standardized covariates employed to explain the
variation of our two dependent variables. Note that we report
non-standardized coefficients for the dummy variables cli-
mate vulnerability,mayor partisanship (Republican &Other),
and type of government. Results for the general climate change
dependent variable are displayed in blue circles, while those
for explicit discussion of climate change are illustrated in
red diamonds (see Appendix H for a comparison of model
performance).
The empirical results generally fit our theoretical expec-
tations. Our main explanatory variable, whether a city is
highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, has a
positive effect on the probability of a city government dis-
cussing climate change in general (log-odds = 0.729, 95%
CI = [0.071, 1.401]) and climate change specifically (log-
odds = 0.889, 95% CI = [0.004, 1.757]). Substantively, com-
pared to a less vulnerable city, a highly vulnerable city is
13.8% more likely of generally discussing climate change
in a given month-year, holding all other variables constant.
The effect on climate-specific discussion is similarly pro-
nounced: a highly vulnerable city is 3% more likely to dis-
cuss climate-specific matters in its press releases in a given
month, compared to a less vulnerable city.
Our results also suggest a partisan effect on climate com-
munication: the county-level vote for Barack Obama in the
2008 presidential election is positively related to general
climate-related discussion (log-odds = 0.278, 95% CI = [-
0.115, 0.681]), as well as climate-specific discussion (log-
odds = 0.544, 95% CI = [0.023, 1.121]). A locale with one
standard deviation above the mean level of support for Obama
in 2008 is 4% more likely to discuss climate change in gen-
eral or 1.5% more likely to have climate-specific discus-
sions, when compared to a locale that exhibited an average
level of voter support for Obama. We find mixed evidence of
a relationship between a mayor’s partisanship and the like-
lihood of climate discussion in city press releases: no mean-
ingful difference between cities with Republican and Demo-
crat mayors emerges in the predicted probability of general
climate-related discussions (log-odds = -0.234, 95% CI =
[-1.1, 0.656]). However, Republican mayors are 1.2% less
likely than their Democrat counterparts to release climate-
specific statements (log-odds = -0.753, 95% CI = [-1.99,
0.464]). We find very little evidence of a difference between
Democrat and independent/non-affiliated (other) mayors in
the predicted probability of discussing climate change, ei-
ther in general or specifically.
A mayor-council (versus a council-manager) form of gov-
ernment is associated with a higher likelihood of discussing
climate change. Holding other variables constant, a mayor-
council type of government is 7.6% more likely to discuss
general climate change or 0.7% more likely discuss climate
change specifically than its council-manager counterpart.
There is little evidence of a relationship between local
temperature anomalies and climate change discussions. This
result holds up to alternative specifications of the tempera-
ture variable. A non-linear (quadratic) specification of local
temperature anomaly, used to control for both cold and hot
extremes, also produces estimates that likely could include
zero.
Moving on to the economic variables, we find somewhat
mixed evidence: general climate discussions (log-odds = -
0.147, 95% CI = [-0.594, 0.283]) decrease as unemployment
rises, while it is very likely that there is no relationship be-
tween climate-specific discussions (log-odds = 0.074, 95%
CI = [-0.567, 0.692]) and unemployment.
As expected, we find a positive effect of county-level
median household income on the probability of general cli-
mate change content (log-odds = 0.227, 95% CI = [-0.179,
0.638]) and climate-specific discussion (log-odds = 0.724,
95% CI = [0.163, 1.295]). Compared to a county with an
average median income, a standard deviation increase in in-
come is associated with a 3.8% increase in discussions about
climate change generally and 2.2% increase in climate change
specific discussions.
Lastly, we find positive effects of logged population (log-
odds = 0.628, 95% CI = [0.24, 1.023]) and the logged num-
ber of releases in a given month (log-odds = 1.138, 95% CI =
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Fig. 3: Explaining variation of climate change discussions in press releases. This plot illustrates the results of the Bayesian hierarchical models
described in Section 6.2. Standardized coefficients (log odds), 50% and 95% credible intervals are displayed for the general climate change
dependent variable (top, blue, circle) and explicit discussion of climate change dependent variable (bottom, red, diamond). Note that regular
coefficients are displayed for the dummy variables climate vulnerability, mayor partisanship (Republican & Other), and type of government. A
table of these results is available in Appendix G.
[0.916, 1.37]) on the probability that a city government will
discuss general climate change issues or climate-specific is-
sues (logged population: log-odds = 0.632, 95% CI = [0.111,
1.165], logged number of monthly press releases log-odds =
1.266, 95% CI = [0.913, 1.643]).
7 Discussion
Cities in the United States are vulnerable to climate change.
In an environment where federal action to address climate
change is increasingly unlikely, cities have the potential to
drive climate change mitigation and adaptation in the United
States. Many cities have responded to this opportunity by
engaging in a diverse set of actions, including such examples
as New York City’s establishment of an Office of Climate
Resiliency. Yet, to date, we know very little about which
city leaders communicate about climate change to their res-
idents, the content of these communications, or the factors
associated with increased discussions. To examine this gap,
we build on existing research on public communication from
other types of political offices (Grimmer and Stewart 2013b),
state climate policy making (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2016),
and other climate-related scholarship on urban policy mak-
ing (Sharp et al. 2011). Analyzing 76,249 press releases from
82 cities, we first engage in a robust process to identify all
communication relating to climate change. We find that while
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many cities engage in some discussion of climate change,
several cities (Boston, New York, Chicago, and Pittsburgh)
are, by far, the most frequent discussants in absolute terms
and cities such as Portland and San Diego discussed climate-
related themes more as a proportion of their total commu-
nication. Future research might evaluate whether there are
substantive differences in how the most active cities discuss
climate change as compared to those cities who only occa-
sionally discuss the issue.
We then evaluate the content of these discussions through
the use of keywords and find that cities discuss climate change
and weather in the general frame of large-scale action and
with a focus on cooperation with federal programs like the
Clean Power Plan. Another major set of press releases focus
on specific policies that cities have put into place, generally
transportation and energy related press releases. For exam-
ple, in Houston, a press release on solar panels notes the
array “will reduce Houston’s carbon footprint.” Future re-
search might evaluate how these discussions are framed, es-
pecially compared to how press releases discuss other policy
issues.
Finally, we evaluate the factors associated with whether
and when cities discuss climate change generally and specif-
ically. Overwhelmingly, we find that highly climate vulner-
able cities are more likely to talk about their global warming
efforts. At the same time, we also find that many of the fac-
tors that have been shown to shape individual preferences
for climate change action (such as income and partisanship)
shape on a city’s climate change communications.
Our research provides a novel view of how climate change
discussions occur in the urban arena. Cities are clearly com-
municating about climate change to the general public, but
some cities are discussing climate change at a much higher
rate. This discourse has the potential to shape public opin-
ion about the need for climate action, the appropriate means
of mitigation and adaptation, and the policies relating to cli-
mate change. Future research might compare climate discus-
sions to actual policy actions: it may be that cities highlight
the less controversial policies in public communication.
That we find a modest effect for the liberalness of the
population and a weak effect for the mayor’s partisanship on
these discussions—and a stronger effect for climate vulnerability—
runs counter to extensive findings at the state and national
level in the United States. As we discussed, US cities have
far more liberal residents than suburban and rural areas. And
it may be that absent the partisan rhetoric at the national
level, voters are generally either ambivalent or supportive of
climate action, which is consistent with many national polls
on climate change.
Our data extends through February 2017, which is prior
to President Trump’s announced intention to withdraw from
the Paris Accord. As we noted at the beginning of the ar-
ticle, many cities have indicated they will remain in com-
pliance with the Paris Accord. Future research could update
our dataset with an additional set of recent press releases.
This would allow an analysis of whether those cities who
have been active on climate change prior to Trump’s with-
drawal are more likely to commit to compliance with the
Paris Accord.
Taken together, our results point to the need to evaluate
climate action at all levels of government. The data we col-
lected provide both depth and breadth to the discussions of
urban government climate policy. The dataset would be im-
proved by a comprehensive set of press releases over time
from a broader set of cities. Fortunately, many cities are
engaging in some discussions of climate change and other
cities are aggressively pursuing a climate agenda. However,
other cities—including some that appear frequently on cli-
mate vulnerable lists — are far less active. Future research
might evaluate how political factors like elections, electoral
competition, and issue ownership shape efforts to address
climate change.
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